

# BERNHARDI DEFENDS THE PURPOSE OF GERMAN MILITARISM

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Independence; the mental capacity and ability and the moral strength which makes it possible to fulfil, with contempt of death, that task even in the most difficult situation and in the greatest dangers. Thus it is obedience upon which rests the inner contact of the German army, but upon the personal, mental, moral and physical independence of all individuals rests its higher efficiency, which is not equalled by any other army.

Is it conceivable that such achievements as our army are carrying out in their struggle against a numerically many times superior enemy, such a fight as our entire nation is carrying out, young and old, rushing to the colors, each individual German ready to sacrifice himself with all that is his for the fatherland, all the women devoting themselves to helping the army, all domestic disputes vanishing; does one believe that all that, defiance of death, enthusiasm and willingness to sacrifice, can be forced by mere obedience?

Nobody is stupid and naive enough to believe that. For only where all mental and moral powers of a nation, exerted to the uttermost, are brought into play are such gigantic achievements as the world has never seen before possible.

It is possible, however, this unanimous rising of a nation of 65,000,000 to death-defying willingness, to sacrifice and flaming enthusiasm was created primarily by the much condemned militarism that has been the high school of an enlightened national consciousness not only for the army but for the whole German people.

When the young men trained in the army return to civil life after their service is over they take with them a fund of moral strength, increased efficiency and deeply rooted patriotism and in this sense continue their work for the fatherland through their example alone. Thus it happened that the whole people feels itself as one with the army, and has been educated to the full exertion of all powers, from which exertion results, in the last analysis, efficiency in all civil occupations. Here too each individual is a fighter in his place; so he has become in the contest of the nations, in science, in the markets of the world, in industry, behind the plough and as pioneer of culture in foreign lands a victor who challenges the envy of half the world.

German militarism, everywhere condemned and pictured as a ghastly menace, thus has proved—the views of our enemies notwithstanding—the German nation's greatest propagator of Kultur; it has achieved the greatest things that can be achieved; it has elevated a whole nation, morally and mentally, to the highest degree and to the devotion to ideal aims; to loyalty unto death; it has not confined itself to train the young men into fighters, it has also furthered and elevated humanity in them, which to-day is necessary, precisely by the strength and conscientiousness and the humane character of our methods of war, so brilliantly contrasting with the brutal and bestial barbarity of the Russian hordes and the wildness of our African opponents.

This militarism, however, according to the assertions of our enemies—which they do not themselves believe—is not only barbaric, but at the same time forms a menace to all other nations; from it there is said to have been developed a spirit of conquest and brute force that should be feared by all, especially by the neighboring countries. That is the ever repeated reproach of our enemies, with which they seek to justify the war they criminally started.

However, they owe the proof, and the undeniable facts prove the contrary.

In the hour of its birth German militarism stepped into life to liberate our fatherland from the yoke of its unparagonable foreign oppression. In the wars of liberation it received the fire test. Then followed long years of peace without German militarism ever making itself noticeable. Prussia did not take up arms again until it faced the task of protecting a German brother nation against its definite Danish violation and to liberate it from foreign yoke; purely a national task. Then came the war of 1866 with Austria, which had become necessary in order to assure an independent existence for the German nation.

Prussia's incorporation of part of the conquered States was a consequence of policy, not of conquest. That is clearly manifested in the sparing of the territorial unit of the Danube monarchy and of the South German States. Nor did it, at that time, occur to any one to blame German "militarism" for the war and its consequences. Nor was this scare word invented in 1870.

This latter war was the repulse of a frivolous attack, plotted by the French Government in order to give the tottering throne of the Napoleons a leaning, and taken out of the national vanity by the French nation. Out of it grew the new German Empire as a necessary consequence of the entire historical development and the victories gained in common by all the Germans. This imperial foundation, too, is a testimony of the wise moderation of the Prussian victor. Only such territorial sacrifices were imposed upon France as were absolutely imperative for the security of our borders. In spite of all wishes to the contrary, the independence of the weaker German States was assured, and as in the army, so in the national formation the principle was enforced that within the necessary unit the efficiency of the entirety is increased by the independence of the individual.

Also, it occurred to no one to denounce. On the contrary, nearly all the States hastened to imitate the national army system, not as a precautionary measure against a feared German "policy of force," but because the social and political organization of the system was recognized.

England alone, considering herself safe behind her wall of waves against any land army, has to this day failed to equip herself with this Kultur-propagator—much to her own detriment. The German Empire, however, which to-day is pictured by its enemies as a menace to Europe, has, despite of all preparations, during forty-three years, far from carrying on a policy of conquest, done everything in its power, at times under consider-



The war machine's advance on Libau, Russia.  
German cavalry and infantry taking up a sheltered position to await orders for the advance.

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able sacrifices, to maintain peace, and at the outbreak of the present world war endeavored to the utmost limit of possibilities and at its own risk to spare the world from this terrible conflict.

The assertion, therefore, that "German militarism" has been a menace to Europe is perfectly untenable and can be proved by nothing. Germany and the Triple Alliance, on the contrary, have for long years been the guardians of peace in Europe, and in 1914 Kaiser Wilhelm drew the sword only because he had been attacked by numerically superior enemies and forced into self-defense.

But how do things stand with the militarism of the other European countries?

Neither in France nor in Russia was universal conscription born of necessity, as it was the case in Germany. Rather it was introduced in order to line up the equilibrium of powers against Germany. In Russia as well as in France, however, this increase in strength very soon assumed an aggressive character. In France preparations were carried on for years with the one thought to defeat Germany and to reconquer Alsace-Lorraine—a thought which also has been the guiding motive of the French policy. Russia, on the other hand, has carried on a continuous aggressive expansion policy—in the Far East, to acquire there free access to the sea, with free ports, and in the near Orient, in order to realize the

century old dream of the conquest of Constantinople and the domination of the Balkan peninsula.

Here Austria stood in her (Russian) way, so the Czar's plans of late were concentrated upon the destruction of that country and the crushing of Austria's ally, Germany. In this direction the French and Russian wishes met. Thus we have been, during the years past, witnesses of tremendous armaments and war preparations which both countries carried through according to mutual plans and agreements, with the unmistakable object to attack Austria and its ally Germany as soon as an opportunity promising success would turn up.

Thus not German militarism but

French and Russian militarism grew into a European menace because, with admittedly aggressive intentions, they carried preparations to the extreme.

In France this became evident through the reintroduction of the three years service term. It also evidenced itself in the fact that in that country the military burden per capita amounts to \$7.91, while in Germany it is only \$4.54. In Russia, on the other hand, the same tendency showed itself in the creation of more and more army corps, in the accumulation of tremendous war material in Poland and in the proposed building up of strategic railroads against the Austro-German frontier.

Germany always found herself on the defensive against these gigantic

efforts of the part of her opponents, which is shown by the fact alone that even under the latest military law not all able bodied men could be drawn.

In France all who could carry arms maintained to the colors and which by far outnumbered all armies of Europe. Moreover, in that country the military service was exactly that which our enemies now maliciously assert of Germany: a training to blind, machine-like obedience which can never result in independent, conscious achievement in war, as the Russo-German war has proved sufficiently and as it proves it again to-day.

Despite the threatening aspect of

the tremendous Franco-Russian preparations, however, war would hardly have resulted from them if England had not joined the war alliance of the two Continental countries, thus encouraging them to throw the gauntlet at Germany's feet. Allied with the sea, powerful England, they felt sure of the victory. Their own land forces were considerably stronger than those of their opponents. England, however, dominated the seas and could cut the central European alliance from all communication with the outside world.

The Franco-Russian militarism, developed to the very extreme, found a welcome aid in the British. In British navalism there really lies a menace to the world, in quite a

different way than in the defenseless German militarism; and this menace is not only a supposed one but an actual one.

England actually dominates the principal commercial highways of the world; she can arrest all overseas commerce; she can tie up all sea trade, can cut off all communication with overseas colonies. Thus she exerts an actual domination at least over the old World, and forms a tangible danger for the freedom of all nations, as has been shown in the present war, in which she has not only closed out many from the world's seas but also tramples with feet the rights of all neutrals. She also used the domination of the seas to limit the free development of all other colonial powers, while taking for herself, often in the midst of peace, the richest territories in the world.

English navalism, therefore, as "German militarism," is the real foe of all nations that have an interest in the freedom of the seas, a general menace, in no small degree to America, which is proved by the present interference with American commerce in the midst of peace with that nation.

On land, however, British militarism certainly is not to be judged as a cultural element. There the army is not formed by the flower of the nation, ready and willing to sacrifice its most sacred goods, but from a horde of hirelings that serve for money and are ready to fight for any object, be it ever so reprehensible. None will maintain that such an army can exert a morally uplifting influence upon the nation.

German militarism, on the other hand, being nothing else than the patriotic and soldierly spirit born of universal conscription, is a cultural factor of the first order and threatens no one in the hands of the moderate German policy, which will ever be moderate, because it corresponds with the German character and German ways; because a Government which desires to carry on a policy of adventure would lose its backbone in its own nation.

But if that is so—and everybody who has any knowledge of Germany will agree with me that it is so—whence this universal cry about German militarism and the dangers allegedly to spring from it, while every other more dangerous and more distinct militarism—Russian, French and English—militarism is regarded as harmless and without danger?

It is not difficult to find the answer. Germany has developed under the immediate and indirect influence of universal conscription into a strong power, not only a military one but a commercial, industrial and colonial nation.

Her military power has long prevented France from undertaking her war of revenge and has kept Russia from materializing by force her Oriental plans that presupposed the crushing of Austria. Germany stood in the way of the realization of two powerful foreign political ambitions. It was only that only the supreme effort could make possible the overthrow of Germany. Upon this supreme effort had to decide, not because Germany threatened them, but vice versa, because the fear of Germany's strength to attack Germany. Her strength was Germany's crime. Besides, she opposed as a strong Power France and Russia's ambitious plans of conquest, her militarism, from which her power had sprung, had to be held as hostile to civilization and thus as dangerous. Not only the people of the countries involved had to be deceived and made willing for war, this way. The libel and slander and deliberate misinterpretation of German militarism was hung over the ambitious and aggressive intentions as a deadly cloak to fool the neutrals.

Not so with England. Germany's rise threatened to outrun the European continental countries. The equilibrium of these countries, dominated by the traditional political standard, seemed imperiled. That could be ascertained. Such a threat was in the eyes of every Englishman a crime against the sacred "status quo" of England. Besides, German commerce and German industry developed more powerfully from day to day, and threatened to become a menace to British commerce.

That, too, was a crime against England, which for centuries has used to rather in the riches of the world without labor and competition. On top of it all a German navy had been created which, it was true, was not yet a fleet, but it was a fleet in an open sea battle, yet strong enough to cause heavy losses and thus in view of the strong navy of other nations, to challenge England's prestige on the seas of the world.

So Germany's strength on the land, as well as on the sea, was a threat to the world commerce, was a threat to England's side, not because Germany threatened England in a military way or in any way violated British rights, but because by her very existence she endangered England's prestige on the seas and because England no longer could afford to let a power could conquer Germany peacefully.

Germany's power was a crime in England's eyes, and as such it was in the last analysis, great and strong, enough to force the neutrals to be branded as a factor in the life of nations.

That is the truth. The envy of Germany's development, and the realization that she was not only the strongest, but the steel-hard, industrial, loving and in all fields powerful nation produced the desire to attack German militarism, and the point where the world was with lies and misrepresentation against the Germans and the military efficiency of the German nation, which of all vital powers, this was the one to be branded as a factor in the life of nations.

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May they try it? May they try it more and more new horrors and to the border wall, may they try it to the world center victory and for the final battle. With all these dire and, indeed, terrible things and the realization that man militarism and had, they become evident that this was branded as a foe of civilization, prove strong enough not only to the world, but to the nations, to safeguard the freedom of nations and to secure an end to the world's militarism.

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Published by the Sun Publishing Company, New York.

## UNCLE SAM BIGGEST BOSS OF LABOR, ALSO THE BEST

UNCLE SAM is not only the largest but in many respects the best employer of certain kinds of labor in the country.

That is the judgment of George B. McGinty, secretary of the Interstate Commerce Commission. And he ought to know. For more than ten years he has been a Government employee, working up from the lowest clerical rank to his present \$5,000 position. Further, he is the man who is in immediate authority over the 2,000 employees of the commission, the one who, in a large measure, "hires and fires."

Is Government employment worth while? Does it get one anywhere? Is it after all, as some say, without hope of future, deadening, destructive of powers of initiative, prone to render one unfit for other class of employment?

Answers to all of these questions depend, in the opinion of Mr. McGinty, more on the individual than on any other element in the problem. His own experience in the Government service might be taken to form the answers, although Mr. McGinty declines to make any such assertion. But still it is an index to the possibilities of Government service.

According to the United States Civil Service Commission, there is now in the service of Uncle Sam, scattered widely over the country, a civilian army of 42,721 men and women. Of these 242,460 obtained their positions in the classified civil service through competitive examinations, just as Mr. McGinty obtained his. Approximately 30,000 are employed in the Government offices in Washington.

There are instances in this army of men and women who have been in the service more than half a century without obtaining high rank or high pay. On the other hand, there are many instances where civil service employees have worked their way to the top in a very short period of years, or have graduated from the Government service into very high paid private employ. Frank Hitchcock formed one of these instances. From a petty clerkship in the Government, he won his way finally to the Cabinet, being Postmaster-General in the Administration of President Taft.

It is customary among the students of the question to compare the civil service with the military services. Officers of the army and navy, for example, popularly are supposed to receive high pay in comparison with the pay received by civil service employees. But examine into the matter.

A colonel of the army, for instance, receives a salary of \$4,000 a year. He receives the grade of colonel rarely under thirty-three years of service in lower ranks, frequently not until twenty years. He is not paid more than \$500 a year. He has worked in less than ten years have worked over \$500 a year. The difference is that every junior officer of the army, provided he behaves himself, keeps his

health and demonstrates his efficiency, is certain to reach the grade of colonel, while no such certainty exists for the civil employee.

Further, in both the army and navy old age and disability retirement pay is provided, while in the civil service there is no retirement pay whatever. Still, as Mr. McGinty points out, opportunity—that is, the broader opportunity of life—is actually more limited in the military than in the civil service.

"Tell me," said the interviewer one day recently to a high officer of the Government, a man who has survived through many Administrations in Washington and who has studied all aspects of Uncle Sam's labor problems—"tell me of a typical instance of a civil service employee who, in his career, demonstrates that there is a future in the service for the right sort of man."

Mr. McGinty of the Interstate Commerce Commission was the instant reply. "He is typical of the new civil service, for you know, the civil service to-day is vastly different from the civil service of twenty, even ten years ago. McGinty, without political assistance, purely on his own merits, has worked his way up through the grades to his present permanent position. Moreover, he is handling the employment problem of the growing Interstate Commerce Commission. See him. He can tell you more than any one I happen to think of offhand, although there are a number who have mounted high."

Hence the journey to Mr. McGinty's office.

"Yes," said this youthful appearing secretary, "there is opportunity in the civil service of the Government. But it all depends on the man, just exactly as it does in business life outside of the Government."

"Uncle Sam," he went on, "is a curious employer. He has his little eccentricities, just as many other employers have theirs. Our Uncle's eccentricity is in the character of his pay schedule. For the very high positions, those apart from the permanent civil service, he pays less than private business pays, while for ordinary clerical labor he pays rather more. As a concrete instance, here is the membership of the Interstate Commerce Commission, seven gentlemen, appointed by the President for fixed terms, charged with tremendous regulatory power over the transportation business of the country. Each of them draws \$10,000 a year; this amount concededly is very much less than men of such ability would command in private practice. They serve for the honor of serving, not for the money rewards. The carrier corporations with which they deal pay executives vastly more than the commissioners receive."

"Proceeding down the official scale in the activities of this commission, we find attorneys, examiners and other civil service employees whose salaries range from \$1,800 up to \$5,000 per annum. There are some 150 of these. They are all able men, of whom about forty are learned lawyers, who are sent out to take testimony as masters in chancery and prepare cases for submission to the commission. It seems to be the rule that none of these shall receive more than the secretary



George B. McGinty, Secretary of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

receives \$5,000, his salary being fixed by law, but I regard that as unfortunate, and hope such limitation will be removed. Character and value of service, not the salary of some one else, should be the guide in fixing rates of compensation.

"These positions are filled, wherever possible, from the ranks of the lesser paid employees in the commission. In other words, promotion awaits the man who makes good. Sometimes we have to go outside of the force to find qualified men, for vacancies are constantly occurring."

"To an extent somewhat the same condition of affairs exists in the other commissions and departments of the Government, but on that I cannot speak with the same knowledge. Possibly the opportunity has been larger in this commission than in the average arm of the Government, since the force we employ has grown so in recent years. Prior to the passage of the so-called Hepburn amendment to the act to regulate commerce in 1906 our force was quite small. Broadened

powers conferred upon the commission required an increase, and now we are making a still sharper increase by reason of the task of valuing the railroads of the country that has been placed on us.

"Thus of the 2,000 employees we have at this time 1,200 are on the valuation work, and presently it is possible that more than double the force will be engaged in that work alone in various parts of the country. We have completed the overhead organization and are employing as rapidly as practicable the working forces. It is a tremendous work, and will be of infinite value, because, for the first time, it is to give the Government the accurate basic figures on which complete and certain regulations of carriers can be obtained. The question of the true worth of a carrier's property enters into practically every question that comes before the commission. The answer is essential to the determination, for example, of the charge. What is a fair rate to be charged?"

"All who are familiar with the Government service know that in the past every unit of organization worked far below the maximum of efficiency by reason of being encumbered with what amounted to pensioners, employees who either had outlived their usefulness or who never had any, but were retained as an act of charity. I am thankful to say that our organization has no pensioners of that class."

"This work of valuing will stretch over several years and will require a large force."

"So far I have discussed the question, is there a future in Government work for the average man? From the standpoint of the Interstate Commerce Commission, viewing it more broadly and looking back to my own experience as a clerk in the Department of Agriculture before I came to the commission, I would say that it is a man going to work on a salary there is no better business for him in the United States than a position in the Government as a civil service employee."

"If a man has an ambition—and the qualifications to engage in business for himself, and particularly if he has a little capital, I would say that he should keep out of the Government service."

"But for the average salaried man there is nothing better. Although, as I have said, the Government does not pay adequate salaries in the higher ranks, it does pay above the average for ordinary clerical work, and in ordinary clerical work the man has an excellent opportunity to develop and to mount to the top."

"It has been said repeatedly that the civil service man who gets up to a three thousand dollar position in reality is not adequately paid for the high character of services required of him. We all know that there are many highly trained technical and scientific men in Government employ drawing such salaries who, measured by industrial and commercial standards, are underpaid. Granting this, in most instances the man never would have had the opportunity to demonstrate his capacity outside the Government service. It is the Government service which has given him the opportunity. But, having demonstrated it, the field of private employment is open to him at vastly greater remuneration."

"This is what I mean by saying that the Government service is, in a measure, a training school."

"Step to think for a moment. Where else is there a greater training school for executives? What is the cry of the business world to-day but for executives, men who can organize and efficiently direct other men? Business has found that no salary is too high to pay to the efficient executive. Never is the supply of such men equal to the demand. And nowhere outside of the Government service is there better opportunity for a man to develop skill as an executive."

"More and more the business world—not alone the transportation world, with which I am more familiar—is turning to the Government service for its executives, its technologists, its scientific assistants. No training school in the country can do the work the Government is doing in this direction."

"Five months work brought him a promotion to \$1,600, and then Commissioner Clements learned of his quality. 'I want you for my confidential clerk,' said the Commissioner, and McGinty moved up to \$2,400. His advancement in the secretaryship under Commissioner Lane came naturally after that."